In his book, former military president General Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) recounts how General Murtala Muhammed became Nigeria’s Head of State, the wave of retirements that followed, and the harrowing events of the 1976 coup that led to his assassination.
Murtala’s Leadership and Military Restructuring
IBB detailed the process that led to Murtala Muhammed’s selection as Head of State following the coup that ousted General Yakubu Gowon.
He emphasized that young senior officers preferred a collective leadership model, but Murtala rejected the idea of being accountable to anyone.
He wrote:
“One of the accusations against General Gowon (which, in retrospect, seemed unfair) was that he ran the business of governance ‘like a one-man show’! So, we, the ‘younger’ senior officers who had played a role in the coup, decided that the new post-Gowon government’s leadership must be overtly collective.
So, while we concluded that Brigadier Murtala Muhammed should be the head of state, our preference was for him to operate only as first among equals, especially in his dealings with the two other prominent senior officers, Brigadiers Olusegun Obasanjo and Theophilus Danjuma.
But we knew Muhammed enough to know he would need to be persuaded to accept such an arrangement.
“So, while the rest of us ‘younger’ senior officers waited in an adjacent room, Colonel Wushishi, Lieutenant-Colonels Joe Garba, Abdullahi Mohammed and Yar’Adua took Brigadiers Muhammed, Obasanjo and Danjuma to another room to negotiate the terms of our proposal for a triumvirate-type leadership where Muhammed will be required to share power with Obasanjo and Danjuma.
I couldn’t describe the mood since we were absent from that meeting. But we were close enough to pick up Muhammed’s thundering voice, rejecting such proposals outrightly. As far as I remember, the meeting lasted for hours past midnight.
Finally, Murtala Muhammed agreed to be head of state while insisting that he would not be beholden to anyone as head of state!”
After assuming power, Murtala swiftly implemented reforms, including the compulsory retirement of all officers above the rank of Major-General or senior to any member of his new government.
He also retired twelve military governors from the Gowon era and investigated their conduct.
“The early days of the Muhammed administration witnessed an unprecedented wave of retirements in Nigeria’s public service that had never been seen before.
After the twelve military governors from the Gowon era were compulsorily retired, the government ordered a probe of their conduct in office.
“Ten of the twelve governors were found guilty of illegal enrichment and ‘dismissed with ignominy.’ Brigadiers Oluwole Rotimi and Mobolaji Johnson were the only two not found to have enriched themselves illegally.”
The Assassination of Murtala Muhammed
Babangida described the fateful events of February 13, 1976, the day of Murtala’s assassination. He narrowly escaped an ambush meant for him by instinctively changing his usual route.
“FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1976, started like any typical day for me. I lived at No 19 Crescent, Ikoyi, Lagos, although my troops were stationed at the cantonment in Ikeja.
However, because the Committee on Army Reorganisation, which I headed, was furiously at work during that period, I reported first in the morning at Defence Headquarters, which was close by, before heading out to Ikeja.
“My regular route to army headquarters was through the faster Osborne Road. But for some reason, on this fateful morning, as my driver opted at about 8.45 a.m. to turn right through our regular route, I instinctively told him to turn left and go through the more open Kingsway Road to avoid possible traffic congestion.
That decision may have saved my life because, unknown to me, Major Ibrahim Rabo’s men, led by Lieutenant Peter Cigari, had been detailed to ambush and kill me on the Osborne Road route.”
Murtala Muhammed’s convoy was ambushed, and he was assassinated along with his ADC, Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa, and his driver, Sergeant Adamu Michika. His orderly, Staff Sergeant Michael Otuwe, survived the attack.
“The plotters’ strategy was to lay several ambushes for different government members along their routes to work that morning. As emerged from subsequent investigations, Major Ibrahim Rabo, Captain Malaki Parwang and Lieutenant William Seri, led by Lt-Col. Bukar Suka Dimka, laid in wait for Muhammed’s entourage.
In a well-coordinated plan, Dimka assigned each assassin specific roles and functions. In aiming his shots at Muhammed, Lieutenant Seri was said to be so ruthless that he emptied more than one magazine of ammunition into the car carrying the head of state.”
IBB’s Face-Off with Dimka
Babangida played a crucial role in countering the coup attempt. He recounted his encounter with the coup leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Buka Suka Dimka, at the Radio House in Ikoyi.
“When we got to Radio House in an armoured column, we noticed that Dimka’s men surrounded the place, primarily young officers who were a part of the plot, including his ADC, 2nd Lt Samuel Garba. As I got down from my armoured vehicle, unarmed, and approached the building, Dimka’s ADC, Garba, attempted to stop me. By now, Dimka had spotted me from the storey building and screamed: ‘Ibrahim, I’m going to shoot you’! I shouted back: ‘Well, that’s okay. If you shoot me, you know my family. You’ll take care of them. They’ll become your responsibility. I have no problem. It would be nice to die in the hands of a friend.’
“After a pause, Dimka soberly replied: ‘Ibrahim, I like your guts. Come upstairs.’”
Dimka initially attempted to persuade Babangida to join the coup but later realized the plot had failed. He pleaded for amnesty, but Babangida reported back to General Theophilus Danjuma, who ordered the immediate suppression of the coup.
“Later that evening, the Federal government announced that the coup attempt had been quashed and declared seven days of national mourning in Murtala’s honour. The next day, February 14, General Muhammed was buried in Kano at a ceremony witnessed by thousands of mourners and members of the SMC, including Major-General Bisalla, who would later be implicated in the coup attempt.
Conclusion
IBB’s account provides an insider’s view of one of Nigeria’s most dramatic political events.
It sheds light on the leadership struggles, the swift reforms under Murtala Muhammed, and the tragic coup that cut his tenure short.
